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The dynamic network of relationships among corporations underlies cascading
economic failures including the current economic crisis, and can be inferred from
correlations in market value fluctuations. We analyze the time dependence of the
network of correlations to reveal the changing relationships among the financial,
technology, and basic materials sectors with rising and falling markets and resource
constraints. The financial sector links otherwise weakly coupled economic sectors,
particularly during economic declines. Such links increase economic risk and the
extent of cascading failures. Our results suggest that firewalls between financial
services for different sectors would reduce systemic risk without hampering economic
growth.
The global economy is a highly complex system [1] whose dynamics reflects the connec-
tions among its multiple components, as found in other networked systems [2–4]. A common
property of complex systems is the risk of cascading failures, where a failure of one node
causes similar failures in linked nodes that propagate throughout the system, creating large
scale collective failures. Economic risks associated with cascading financial losses are mani-
fest in the current economic crisis [5] and the earlier Asian economic crisis [6], but are not
considered in conventional measures of investment risk [7].
A central question is the role that complex systems science can play in informing reg-
ulatory policy that preserves the ability of markets to promote economic growth through
freedom of investment, while protecting the public interest by preventing financial meltdowns
due to systemic risk.
Characterizing the network of economic dependencies and its relationship to risk is key
[8–12]. The dependencies among organizations involve large numbers of factors, including
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2competition for capital and labor, supply and demand relationships among organizations
that deliver common end products or rely upon common inputs, natural disasters and climate
conditions, acts of war and peace, changes of government or its policies including economic
policy such as interest rates, and geographic association. Quantifying such dependencies,
e.g., through Leontief models [13, 14], is difficult because many of the dependencies are non-
linear and driven by socio-economic events not included in these models. Also, behavioral
economics [15–17] suggests that under some conditions collective investor behavior, e.g.,
from perceptions of value, may have significant effects. Reflecting both fundamental and
behavioral interactions, correlations in market value of firms can serve as a measure of
the perceived aggregate financial dependence and quantify “herding” behavior in collective
fluctuations. Moreover, price correlations are directly relevant to measures of risk.
We constructed a network of dependencies among 500 corporations having the largest
stock trading volume, augmented with several economic indices (oil prices, and bond prices
reflecting interest rates). We formed a network where links are present for the highest
correlations in daily returns in each year from 2003 to 2008. In order to display the effect of
changes over time, we constructed a single network over all years, with each corporation in a
particular year represented by a node linked to itself in the previous and next year. Each year
is separately shown in Figure 1. We included only economic sectors that are significantly self-
correlated, as the larger network constructed from the entire market obscures key insights.
Previous correlational analyses have described how correlations may arise from external
forces across the market (arbitrage pricing theory [18, 19]) or used correlations to characterize
sectors and market crashes (econophysics [20, 21]). This work lacks an understanding of the
economic origins of changes in dependencies and their policy implications. We examine
variations of within- and between-sector correlations, arising from non-linear effects, for
information about changes in economic conditions prior to and during the economic crisis.
The study of network community properties often requires careful analysis [22]. In our
case, the observations we describe are manifest visually and were also tested statistically. In
particular, apparent trends were tested using the t-statistic of differences in link densities
within and between sectors (merging), or the minimum of this statistic between one sector
and each of the others (self-clustering). Sectors are statistically linked (unlinked) to an
index, if the t-statistic comparing links to the index relative to the link density of the graph
is above 4 (below 2).
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FIG. 1: Network of correlations of market daily returns for years as indicated. Dots represent individual corporations col-
ored according to economic sector: technology (blue), basic materials including oil companies (light grey) and others (dark
grey), and finance including real-estate (dark green) and other (light green). Links shown are the highest 6.25% of Pearson
correlations of log(p(t)/p(t − 1)) time series, where p(t) are adjusted daily closing prices of firms [50], in each year. Larger
dots are spot oil prices at Brent, UK and Cushing, OK (black) and the price of ten year treasury bonds (green).
The following observations and trends from 2003 through 2008 are apparent and quan-
tifiable: In 2003 there is a separate cluster of real estate related financial institutions (dark
green), which over time merges into the larger financial cluster (green) (not merged through
2004 quarter 4, p < 10−10, from 2007 quarter 2 to 2008 quarter 3, p ≥ 0.18.). The tech-
nology sector (blue), while strongly clustered during economic growth (2003-2006), becomes
relatively weakly clustered during the economic crisis (2008) (self-clustering statistic has
negative slope, p < 10−66, and changes sign in 2008, p < 10−10). Interest rates (larger green
dot) are sometimes related to the technology cluster (linked for 8 out of 26 quarters). The
4oil sector (grey) is highly clustered (any other sector is separate, p < 10−13), and over time
becomes increasingly linked to the rest of the basic materials cluster (dark grey) (positive
slope, p < 10−45), which itself becomes more connected to the technology cluster (positive
slope, p < 10−64). The oil cluster is only sometimes correlated to oil prices (large black
dots) (linked for 7 of 27 quarters). We will show that the network dynamics are consistent
with the sequence of economic events of the financial crisis [5]. In traditional external factor
models and models of collective behavior in interacting systems [1], correlations are con-
stant over time, but recent models have introduced the fitting of dynamical correlations of
market indices [26, 27]. We will show that changes in correlations among corporations can
be understood using intuitive models for this period of time.
Specific external events can be identified whose timing coincides with observed changes
in correlations. Fig. 2C shows that the merger of the real estate and other financial sectors
stocks coincides with both a peak in search frequency for “housing bubble” on Google [33],
and a turning point in the behavior of housing prices (p < 10−3). This timing is consistent
with the understanding [5] that the decline in housing prices triggered the financial system
crisis due to large investments in mortgage backed securities across the financial sector.
Fig. 2D shows a potential role of critical resources: first, in the changing coupling of the basic
materials sector to other parts of the economy; second, in the changing coupling of oil sector
to oil prices, which is only one of the factors affecting the oil industry. Nonlinearity due to
dramatic increases in prices can readily be explained because they are additive components
of fundamental economic factors, i.e., costs of production. When commodity prices are low,
other components dominate, but when commodity prices are high they have larger effects,
so the fractional variation is nonlinearly related to the total. The proximate coincidence
of the severe commodities price increases [34] with the housing crisis (p < 10−5) may be
understood either through fears of commodity shortages due to rapid growth, or the transfer
of investment from the housing sector to commodities [35]—investment demand rather than
a use demand surge. This is consistent with the observation that economic growth by itself
does not cause high correlations. However, general considerations of the role of constraints
imply that when growth encounters the limit of available resources, increased correlations
should occur as changes in one sector impact resource availability for another. Note that the
correlations are primarily positive—commodity values rise with increasing financial sector
values—consistent with fears of growth causing shortages or increasing investment demand.
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FIG. 2: Market correlations and external events from 1985 to 2008. A: The average strength of correlations within and
between economic sectors. Sectors included are finance (green), technology (blue), and basic materials (grey), double col-
ored lines are correlations between sectors (blue-grey, blue-green, and grey-green). Correlations are calculated using twelve
month windows, shifted quarterly from Jan 1985 through Jan 2008. B: Average correlations among stocks from all economic
sectors. Black to light grey lines omit in each 12 month period the highest 0, 2, 5, 10, 20 absolute average return days re-
spectively. C: Financial sector correlations separated into real estate related (dark green), other (light green), and between
these sectors (hatched light and dark green) using left axis scale. The arrow indicates the effective merger of the sectors.
Also shown are a housing price indicator (red, using right axis scale) [51] and the search volume on Google for “housing bub-
ble” (blue, arbitrary units) [52]. D: Basic materials sector correlations separated into oil (light grey) and others (dark grey)
as well as finance (green), with mixed color lines reflecting inter-sector correlations (left axis scale). Also shown are prices
of spot oil in Brent, UK (light red) and Cushing, OK (dark red), aluminum (light blue) and copper (dark blue) normalized
to maximum values (right axis, both oil prices are normalized to the maximum of Cushing, OK). Average correlation of oil
price in OK with the oil sector is shown (red/grey hatched). Arrow is the merger of oil and other basic materials. E: Rolling
average correlations of the sectors in A (blue, left axis scale) shown with market value change (green, left axis scale, the re-
turn of S&P500 index). Market declines (negative returns) coincide with higher than average market correlations (p < 0.02).
Also shown are effective limits on interbank loans (red, right axis scale, the difference between the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) and the Federal Funds Overnight Rate (annualized) at the beginning of each quarter, divided by the latter),
having high values in the current economic crisis.
6Negative correlations would be expected if commodity prices actually constrained economic
growth.
Limiting investments (i.e., limiting capital-to-asset ratios) in order to moderate risk di-
rectly influences opportunities for growth. However, our results also point to a different
strategy, which recognizes that financial institutions cross-link otherwise weakly correlated
economic sectors. The key is that economic couplings among companies propagate the effect
of failures. If economic entity G fails in a financial obligation to entity H, the impact on H
may affect other entities J and K, that are linked to H, even if their activity has nothing to do
with G. Conversely, while a small capital-to-asset ratio may be risky for a particular institu-
tion, if the investments are within a particular economic sector the failure of that institution
is unlikely to cause economy wide repercussions. Thus, segregating financial relationships,
particularly among activities that are not otherwise related, or are weakly related, reduces
systemic risk.
The idea that separations between components of the financial sector contribute to eco-
nomic stability was a key aspect of legislation to stabilize the American banking system
after the market crash of 1929. The Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 [44, 47] separated invest-
ment banking from consumer (retail) banking to prevent the fluctuations from other parts of
the economy affecting consumer banking. This Act was progressively eroded until its repeal
in 1999 [45]. Other historical forms of separation imposed by law or by practice included
the separation of savings and loan associations and insurance providers from commercial
and investment banking, as well as geographic separation by state [44, 45]. While many
effects contribute to correlations in economic activity [13, 46], nonlinearities associated with
investment during market declines support the historical intuition that regulating these de-
pendencies is more critical than regulating those arising from, e.g., supply chains. One
of the arguments in favor of deregulation was that banks, by investing in diverse sectors,
would have greater stability [47]. Our analysis implies that the investment across economic
sectors itself creates increased cross-linking of otherwise much more weakly coupled parts of
the economy, causing dependencies that increase, rather than decrease, risk. Quite gener-
ally, separation prevents failure propagation and connections increase risks of global crises.
Subdivision is a universal property of complex systems [1, 48]. An increase in separation of
financial services is likely to entail costs, and the cost-benefit tradeoffs of imposing particular
types of separation are yet to be determined.
7In summary, complex systems science focuses on the role of interdependence, a key as-
pect of the dynamical behavior of economic crises as well as the evaluation of risks in both
“normal” and rare conditions. We have analyzed the dynamics of correlational dependencies
in rising and falling markets. The impact on the economic system of repeals of Depression-
era government policies is becoming increasingly manifest through scientific analysis of the
current economic crisis. Previous studies [49] showed that repeal of the “uptick rule” in
2007 reduced economic stability by reducing returns and increasing fluctuations of the secu-
rities market. This study suggests that erosion of the Glass–Steagall Act, the consolidation
of banking functions, and cross sector investments eliminated “firewalls” that could have
prevented the housing sector decline from triggering a wider financial and economic crisis.
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